Is a person convicted of Reclusion Perpetua eligible to be granted parole?

It is important in this connection that Section 2 of Act. No. 4103 provides that the Act shall NOT apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-imprisonment; to those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; to those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof. Act No. 4103 (As Amended by Act No. 4225 and Republic Act No. 4203  (Emphasis supplied)

In Republic Act No. 9346, an Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, Section 3 thereof provides that persons convicted of offenses punished with Reclusion Perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.



Section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103 as amended by Act No. 4225) states that the Act shall not apply to, among others, persons convicted of offenses punishable with the death penalty, or life imprisonment. Notably, there was no reference to persons convicted of offense punishable with Reclusion Perpetua. However, the Court, in several cases, has considered the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua to be synonymous to life imprisonment for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and has ruled that this law does not apply to persons convicted of offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua.

Parole is extended only to those convicted of divisible penalties. Reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty and carries no minimum nor maximum period. Section 5 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that it is after “any prisoner shall have served the minimum penalty imposed on him” that the Board of Indeterminate Sentence may consider whether such prisoner may be granted parole. With no “minimum penalty” imposable on those convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua, then even prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9346, persons sentenced by final judgment to reclusion perpetua could not have availed of parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. (Concurring Opionion of Justice Tinga in People v. Tubongbanua, 532 Phil. 434 (2006) as cited in A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC (Aug. 4, 2015)

It should be remembered also that in the light of Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659 which amended Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code by specifically fixing the duration of Reclusion Perpetua at twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, the issue reached the Supreme Court on whether reclusion perpetua is already a divisible penalty or not. The Supreme Court in People vs. Conrado B. Lucas, G.R. No. 108172-73, January 9, 1995 held that:

“Since the issue of whether the amendment of Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code by Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659 has made reclusion perpetua a divisible penalty is one of first impression and of sufficient importance, the First Division referred the motion for clarification to the Court en banc. The latter accepted the referral.
 After deliberating on the motion and re-examining the legislative history of R.A. No. 7659, the Court concludes that although Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. It shall then remain as an indivisible penalty.” (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, in People vs. Diomedes Magallano and Marcelo Magallano, G.R. No. 114872, January 16, 1997, citing the case of People vs. Saliling, G.R. No. 117732, the Supreme Court again clarified that:

xxx
“As has heretofore been the nature of this penalty, reclusion perpetua, remains as an indivisible penalty without any minimum, medium, or maximum period. As such, it should be imposed in the case at bar in its entire duration in accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code regardless of the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime. (Emphasis supplied)

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The Board of Pardons and Parole issued Resolution No. 24-4-10 – Amending and Repealing Certain Rules and Sections of the Rules on Parole and Amended Guidelines for Recommending Executive Clemency of the 2006 Revise Manual of the Board of Pardons and Parole. Now rule 2.2.  on Disqualification for Parole, xxx par. i. provides that those convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences were reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of Republic Act. No. 9346 enacted on June 24, 2006, amending Republic Act. 7659 dated January 1, 2004.

Based on the foregoing discussions, it is very clear that one who is convicted and meted out with a penalty of reclusion perpetua is not eligible for the grant of executive clemency/parole.