Act 3326 must have to be amended ASAP

Zaldivia v Reyes G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 277  EN BANC

Facts: A complaint was filed before the fiscal’s office constituting an offense in violation of a city ordinance. The fiscal did not file the complaint before the court immediately but instead filed it 3 months later. The defendant’s counsel filed a motion to quash on ground that the action to file the complaint has prescribed. The fiscal contends that the filing of the complaint before his office already interrupts the prescription period.Issue: Whether or not the filing of information/complaint before the fiscal office constituting a violation against a special law/ordinance interrupts prescription.

Held: The mere filing of complaint to the fiscal’s office does not interrupt the running of prescription on offenses punishable by a special law. The complaint should have been filed within a reasonable time before the court. It is only then that the running of the prescriptive period is interrupted.

**Act 3326 is the governing law on prescription of crimes punishable by a special law which states that prescription is only interrupted upon judicial proceeding.

LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents. G.R. No. 167571             November 25, 2008 SECOND DIVISION

Facts: The petitioner filed a complaint in the prosecutor’s office a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violation of BP 22, a special law which do not provide for the prescription of penalty in Quezon City. City Prosecutor only found probable cause against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed appeal before DOJ. DOJ granted the petition and directed City Prosecutor to conduct reinvestigation of the case. In March 15, 1999, more than four years has elapsed, Assistant City Prosecutor dismissed the case holding the case already prescribe after four (4) years. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. The petitioner reach the Supreme Court and argued that delays in DOJ flip-lopping decision and CA pronouncement would result in grave injustice to him since the delays in the case were clearly beyond his control  Issue: Whether or not the filing of information/complaint before the fiscal office constituting a violation of a special law/ordinance interrupts prescription.

Held:  The filing of information/complaint before the fiscal office constituting a violation of a special law/ordinance interrupts prescription. While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription. Indeed to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.

OBSERVATION AND COMMENTS:

There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read:

XXX. Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. XXX (Emphasis supplied)

In the Panaguiton case, which was decided of later date, the court has adopted a liberal construction of the law to favor the right of the victim (offended party) arguing that judicial proceeding should be interpreted to mean that it includes both administrative and judicial proceedings because of the change in the government set-up which vested the executive department the investigative process. This decision however which was rendered by the Second Division of the Supreme Court has a lot of problems and fails to convince due to the following reasons to wit:

The correct interpretation of Act No. 3326 should be  that: the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court  xxx. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.  This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does. (Zaldivia V. Reyes);

The interpretation of the law to cater the current and prevailing time is as if a judicial legislation which cannot be done without violation of the enshrined principle of separation of powers between the three branches of the government, e.g. Judiciary and Congress. A crime punished by a special law/ordinance, which may prescribe even if complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor’s office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is therefor to amend Art. 3326 which power is properly vested in the Congress.

The law is clear and there is no room for construction.

The doubt as to the provision of Art. 3326 which resulted from the change of the Government set up should be interpreted to favor the accused. It is well-settled rule that in case of doubt, criminal law must be interpreted in favor of the accused. (P v. Santos). Such change in the set-up which eventually benefited the accused because the government has not amended the law yet should be interpreted to favor the accused;

The exercise of the rule making power of the Supreme Court does not allow to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights under Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. To allow therefor a construction of the law, totally foreign from its meaning, tends to diminish this right of the accused;

The original offended party in a criminal case is the state, hence, it’s fault of delays in the prosecution of or investigative processes should not redound to the detriment and prejudice of the accused. This is without however prejudice to the right of offended party in the civil aspect which may arise other than the damages ex-delicto; and

Zaldivia Case is an En Banc decision which compared to Panaguiton which was only ruled by the Second Division of the Supreme Court. Thus Zaldivia Doctrine should still be the prevailing doctrine following AM No. 10-4-20-SC, sec. 3 par (i) where it provides that  the Suprme Court En Banc shall sit in matters and cases xxx where a doctrine or principle laid down by the Court En Banc or by a Division may be modified or reversed xxx. Panaguiton, having been decided by SC second division only, should yield over Zaldivia case;

In wise, it is respectfully submitted that our Congress should amend Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 so that it reads:

Xxx

SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof by the offended party, by the authority, or its agent, and the institution of judicial or administrative proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

xxx